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Notes
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-POWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO REMOVE
A DIRECTOR OF THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHoRITY-The President

of the United States ousted Arthur E. Morgan from his position
as Chairman of the Board of the Tennessee Valley Authority.
Morgan instituted the present action challenging the power of
the President to remove him without cause.' Held, for defendant.
No provision of the Tennessee Valley Authority act was intended
to limit the removal power of the President. Morgan v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, 28 F. Supp. 732 (D.C. Tenn. 1939).
The Constitution contains no provision which expressly vests
in the President the power to remove subordinates from office; 2
4
this power is implied as a corollary 3 of the power to appoint.
In the absence of constitutional' or statutory restrictions, the
President may remove any officer whom he has appointed.6
Furthermore, in Myers v. United States' the Supreme Court held
that Congress cannot restrict the power of the President to remove purely executive officers. Thus, limitations on the President's removal power involve: (1) a problem of statutory con1. It was admitted by counsel for defendant that Morgan was not removed for any specific ground laid down in the statute. Morgan v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, 28 F. Supp. 732, 733 (D.C. Tenn. 1939).
2. U.S. Const. Art II, § 4, contains the only express provisions for removal: "The President, Vice-President, and all civil Officers of the United
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of,
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."
3. "The power of removal is incident to the power of appointment.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 122, 47 S. Ct. 21, 71 L. Ed. 160 (1926).
4. U. S. Const. Art. II § 1: "The executive Power shall be vested in
" § 2 ". . . and he shall
a President of the United States of America ..
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Counsels, Judges of the
Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established
" § 3 " . . . he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully exby Law..
ecuted, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States."
5. Although judges of the federal courts are appointed by the President (see note 5, supra), he cannot remove them because of the provisions of
U.S. Const. Art. III, § 1: ". . . The Judges, both of the Supreme, and inferior
"
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour. ..
6. "In the absence of all constitutional provision, or statut6ry regulation, it would seem to be a sound and necessary rule, to consider the power
of removal as incident to the power of appointment." Ex parte Hennen,
38 U.S. 230, 259, 10 L. Ed. 138 (1839); Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324,
17 S. Ct. 880, 42 L. Ed. 185 (1897); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 47 S. Ct.
21, 71 L. Ed. 160 (1926).
7. 272 U.S. 52, 47 S. Ct. 21, 71 L. Ed. 160 (1926).
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struction to determine whether there was a legislative intent to
limit the power of the President; and (2) a determination of the
nature of the office affected in order to ascertain if such a limitation is constitutionally valid.8 The court avoided the vexing
task of classifying the varied powers of the much-litigated T.
V. A. by basing its decision on the first and admittedly 9 narrower
point.
Prior to the Myers' ° case, the Supreme Court followed the
path of least constitutional resistance whenever the President's
removal power was contested. Thus, the court circumvented a
statute which specified court martial as the sole method of removing army chaplains by holding that the consent of the Senate, implied from its confirmation of a successor, somehow
validated presidential removal of a chaplain.11 Similar statutory
juggling permitted the removal of a United States attorney appointed under a statute which established a four year term of
office and contained no provision for removal. 1 2 In Shurtleff v.
United States 8 the Supreme Court did not find a sufficiently
power in a
clear and explicit intention to limit the President's
4
statute which contained no stated term of office.'
The court in Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 5 although
holding that the intention could be implied, retained the proposition that the background of the statute and the inferences drawn
from its provisions must show an undoubted intention to take
away the excutive's general power of removal.'
8. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 55 S. Ct. 869, 79 L.
Ed. 1611 (1935).
9. ". . . it is apparent that the precise question here for decision is narrower than that considered in any of the cases herein referred to [Myers
and Humphrey's cases] .... " Morgan v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 28 F.
Supp. 732, 736 (D.C. Tenn. 1939).
10. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 47 S. Ct. 21, 71 L. Ed. 160 (1926).
11. Blake v. United States, 103 U.S. 227, 26 L. Ed. 462 (1881).
12. Parson v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 17 S. Ct. 880, 42 L. Ed. 185 (1897).
13. 189 U.S. 311, 23 S. Ct. 535, 47 L. Ed. 828 (1903).
14. The presence in the Humphrey's case of a stated term of office distinguished it from the Shurtleff case. Although the statutes involved in
both cases contained identical provisions for removal-"may be removed
from office at any time by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office"-the court argued that Congress could not have intended to give Shurtleff, an appraiser, the right to hold office for life or until
found guilty of some act specified in the statute, but that, because of the
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial nature of Humphrey's office, the evident
intention of Congress was to make it safe from Presidential control for
the term stated in the act.
15. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 55 S. Ct. 869, 79 L.
Ed. 1611 (1935).
16. "But if the intention of Congress that no removal should be made
during the specified term except for one or more of the enumerated causes
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In view of the above, there appears to be ample ground for
the present holding that an attempted legislative limitation was
not shown by "express provision, or by the clearest implication.' 1 7 The statute establishing the T. V. A. contains no express
limitations. Section 4,18 providing for the removal of board mem-

bers by concurrent resolution of Congress, and Section 6,19 requiring the President to remove any member of the board who
establishes political qualifications in the appointment of employees, are the provisions of the statute from which an intention
to protect from presidential removal might be inferred. However, the legislative history of the act does not reveal a considered
purpose on the part of Congress to free the T. V. A. from presidential control. 20 This background likewise negatives the idea
that Section 421 was intended as an assumption by Congress of
the entire general removal power instead of merely a reservation
of a supplemental power. Nor can it be said that Section 6,22
which imposes a duty on the President, clearly and explicitly
implies an intention to restrict the removal power.
Should the court's present construction of the statute be
erroneous, it will be necessary to decide whether the T. V. A.
is a purely-executive instrumentality, or whether it belongs to
that vague fourth branch of the government established by the
were not clear upon the face of the statute, as we think it is, it would be
made clear by a consideration of the character of the commission and the
legislative history which accompanied and preceded the passage of the
act. . . ." Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 623, 55 S. Ct. 869,
79 L. Ed. 1611 (1935).
17. Morgan v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 28 F. Supp. 732, 737 (D.C. Tenn.
1939).
18. 48 Stat. 60 (1939), as amended by 49 Stat. 1075, 1076, 1080 (1935), 16
U.S.C.A. § 831c (f) (Supp. 1938): ". . . The board shall select a treasurer and
as many assistant treasurers as it deems proper, which treasurer and assistant treasurers shall give such bonds for the safe-keeping of the securities
and moneys of the said Corporation as the board may require: Provided,
that any member of said board may be removed from office at any time by
a concurrent resolution of the Senate and the House of Representatives."
19. 48 Stat. 63 (1933), 16 U.S.C.A., § 831e (Supp. 1938): "In the appointment of officials and the selection of employees for said Corporation, and
in the promotion of any such employees of officials, no political test or
qualification shall be permitted or given consideration, but all such appointments and promotions shall be given and made on the basis of merit and
efficiency. Any member of said board who is found by the President of the
United States to be guilty of a violation of this section shall be removed from
office by the President of the United States, and any appointee of said board
who is found by the board to be guilty of violation of this section shall be
removed from office by said board."
20. See the following sections of the T. V. A. Act, 48 Stat. 58 (1933), 16
U.S.C.A. § 831 et seq. (Supp. 1938): §§ 2 (a), 2 (b), 2 (e), 4 (k), 5 (i), 5 (n), 6,
7 (b), 9 (a), 9 (b), 13, 14, 16, 17, 23, 24.
21. See note 19, supra.
22. See note 20, supra.
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Humphrey's 8 decision-the quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
administrative bodies. In view of the wide field of activities
covered by the Authority, such a decision would obviously require a clearer definition of those terms than can be found in the
Humphrey's case.
F. S. C., Jr.

BANKRUPTCY-APPEALS -ALLOWANCE

OF APPELLATE COURT-

JUDGMENT INVOLVING LESS THAN $500-An appeal

from an order

of the district court directing the trustee in bankruptcy to furnish
a transcript of certain testimony was taken without the allowance
of the appellate court. Held, that the appeal was properly taken,
as Section 24(a) of the Bankruptcy Act' limits the cases where
allowance of the appellate court is required to those involving
money alone and in a lesser amount than $500. Stein v. Elizabeth
Trust Co., 104 F. (2d) 777 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1939).
Prior to the Chandler Amendment appellate procedure was
both awkward and dangerous. 2 In all orders in proceedings in
bankruptcy, as distinguished from controversies arising in bankruptcy proceedings,3 it was necessary in taking an appeal to
obtain the allowance of the appellate court, except in the three
instances listed under Section 25 (a).4 In controversies arising in
23. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 55 S. Ct. 869, 79 L.
Ed. 1611 (1935).
1. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 24(a), as amended by Act of June 22, 1938,
c. 575, 52 Stat. 854, 11 U.S.C.A. § 47(a) (Supp. 1938): "The Circuit Courts of
Appeals of the United States and the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia . . . are hereby invested with appellate jurisdiction from
the several courts of bankruptcy in their respective jurisdictions in proceedings in bankruptcy, either interlocutory or final, and in controversies arising
in proceedings in bankruptcy ....
Provided further, That when any order,
decree, or judgment involves less than $500, an appeal therefrom may be
taken only upon allowance of the appellate court." (Italics supplied.)
2. Under the old Act appellate jurisdiction was governed by two sections:
Section 24(a) dealt with controversies and Sections 24(b) and 25(a) dealt with
proceedings. In the new Act Section 24(a) covers both. Act of June 22, 1938,
c. 575, 52 Stat. 854, 11 U.S.C.A. § 47(a) (Supp. 1938).
3. The distinction between the two is that proceedings in bankruptcy
include only matters internal to the bankruptcy administration, while controversies arising In bankruptcy proceedings relate to issues arising between
the trustee as the general representative of the bankrupt estate and third
parties claiming the right to keep property outside the bankruptcy administration. See Childs v. Ultramares Corp., 40 F. (2d) 474 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1930),
and cases therein cited.
4. Collier, Bankruptcy (Gilbert, 4 ed. 1937) 514, H§ 727-728.
Section 25(a) formerly provided: "That appeals, as in equity cases,
may be taken in bankruptcy proceedings . . . in the following cases, to-wit,
(1) from a judgment adjudging or refusing to adjudge the defendant a

